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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Section 
78-4-11 Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a conviction for driving or being in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was arrested for DUI and driving while on suspension 
on February 17, 1990. He was arraigned in the Third Circuit Court, 
Tooele Department on March 8, 1990. Trial was scheduled for March 
29, 1990 but was continued to April 23, 1990. Defendant was 
convicted of DUI. He was sentenced on June 8, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 8, 1990, defendant appeared before the Honorable 
Edward A. Watson, Third Circuit Court, Tooele Department, for 
arraignment. At that time, the court set trial for March 29, 1990. 
(R. 9) Defendant stated that that time was only four days after a 
scheduled appointment with his attorney. The court then told 
defendant " . . . you call him and tell him you—you've been 
arraigned, you have the notice of the trial date, let him at least 
begin reviewing it, and he'll probably having [sic] you in earlier 
or something, to discuss it." (Arraignment T. 6) Notwithstanding 
the court's admonition to the defendant to see counsel sufficiently 
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in advance of trial, defendant apparently waited until :)ust before 
trial to contact his attorney. (Motion T. 4). 
On March 27, 1990, two days before trial, Mr. Franklin L. 
Slaugh filed an appearance and a jury demand. On March 2 9, 1990, 
the trial date, Mr. Slaugh moved the court for a continuance of the 
trial. As grounds for the motion, Mr. Slaugh said that he had had 
insufficient time to prepare and to interview the defendant's 
witnesses. Mr. Slaugh said he asked the defendant " . . . why he 
waited so long to get in touch with me, and his response was that 
he was trying to come up with the money before he contacted me. I 
would have preferred a little more lead time, as I've indicated, to 
prepare for the matter." (Motion T. 4) Defendant was not present 
on the date set for trial although he had been personally notified 
of the trial date and Mr. Slaugh directed him to appear. (Motion 
T. 3) 
The prosecutor did not object to the continuance if the 
defendant paid witness fees and would not use the continuance as a 
vehicle to cure an untimely jury demand. (Motion T. 3) Mr. Slaugh 
expressly waived defendant's jury demand. (Motion T. 3,5) The 
court never indicated to Mr. Slaugh that the continuance would be 
denied unless defendant waived the right to a jury trial. (Motion 
T. 2-5) 
Defendant was tried on April 23, 1990. Officer Shelton 
testified that the defendant was behind the wheel of a vehicle when 
the officer approached it (Trial T. 10) and that the engine was 
running at the time. (Trial T. 29) Officer Shelton noted that 
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defendant's speech was slurred, he had an odor of alcohol, and 
although the defendant searched for several minutes, he was unable 
to locate either his driver's license or the vehicle registration. 
(Trial T. 11) Defendant's balance was poor (Trial T. 11) and he 
admitted having consumed "a few beers." (Trial T. 12) 
Officer Shelton also testified that after determining that 
defendant had no injuries, he administered some field sobriety 
tests on a smooth paved surface with no adverse wind conditions. 
(Trial T. 12) Defendant was unable to follow instructions, 
miscounted, and lost his balance repeatedly during the tests. 
(Trial T. 13-15) 
Officer Shelton is a category one certified peace officer. 
(Trial T. 4-5) Based upon his training, experience, and 
observations of the defendant, Officer Shelton opined that the 
defendant was impaired to a degree that he could not drive safely. 
(Trial T. 15) Officer Shelton arrested the defendant and asked him 
to take an intoxilizer test. The defendant refused. (Trial T. 16-
17) The defendant continued to refuse to take the test even after 
being warned that his license could be revoked for a year for 
refusing. (Trial T. 17-18) 
The defendant called Kerry R. Lenzing as a witness. On cross 
examination, Mr. Lenzing testified that defendant was "drunk." 
(Trial T. 26) 
Defendant was found guilty of Driving While Under the 
Influence of Alcohol. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Evidence adduced at trial from both the State's and the 
defendant's witnesses established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was too intoxicated to drive safely while in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle. Defendant could not find his 
license or registration, was unable to perform field sobriety 
tests, and had physical characteristics consistant with being under 
the influence of alcohol. The arresting officer testified that 
defendant was incapable of driving safely due to his alcohol 
impairment. Defendant did not testify but called a witness who on 
cross examination said that the defendant was "drunk." (Trial T. 
26) . 
Defendant's trial counsel willingly waived defendant's right 
to a jury trial. The trial judge did not condition defendant's 
request for a continuance upon a jury trial waiver. While the 
prosecutor stated that the State would not object to a continuance 
if it would not be used to cure a late jury demand, the court did 
not indicate that granting of the continuance was contingent upon 
the waiver. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant Was in Actual Physical Control of a Vehicle While 
Too Intoxicated to Drive Safely. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's findings that he was 
too intoxicated to drive safely. Defendant has the burden on 
appeal to show that the court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
4 
In order to show clear error, the appellant 
must marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against 
attack. 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990). 
The trial court found that 1) the officer had probable cause 
to stop the truck; 2) defendant was in actual physical control of 
the truck at the time of the stop; 3) defendant was impaired by 
alcohol to the extent that he was not able to drive safely. (Trial 
T. 37) Defendant does not challenge the court's findings that 
probable cause existed nor that defendant was in actual physical 
control of the truck. Rather, he asserts that the evidence did not 
establish a sufficient degree of impairment. 
This argument ignores evidence presented both by the State and 
by defendant's own witness. The State's witness established that 
defendant's speech was slurred, he had an odor of alcohol, and, 
although he searched for several minutes, he was unable to locate 
either his driver's license or his vehicle registration. (Trial T. 
11) Defendant's balance was poor (Trial T. 11) and he admitted 
having consumed "a few beers." (Trial T. 12) When Officer Shelton 
administered field sobriety tests, defendant was unable to follow 
instructions, miscounted, and lost his balance repeatedly. (Trial 
T. 13-15) Officer Shelton also offered his opinion as a trained 
and experienced peace officer that defendant was impaired to a 
degree that he could not drive safely. (Trial T. 15) 
Additionally, the defendant's refusal to take an intoxilizer test 
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(Trial T. 16-18) can best be described as conduct indicating a 
consciousness of guilt. 
Defendant's own witness, Kerry R. Lenzing, testified that 
defendant was "drunk," (Trial T. 26) 
While any one of these facts, taken in isolation, may not 
prove defendant's guilt, taken together the effect is synergistic 
and constitutes overwhelming proof. 
Defendant's brief seems to imply that the trial court somehow 
improperly considered the driving pattern as proof of defendant's 
guilt. (Appellant's Brief 5). The court's findings, however, 
clearly show that the court considered the driving pattern only as 
providing probable cause for the stop and not as evidence of 
defendant's impairment. (Trial T. 37-8) Indeed, the other 
evidence of defendant's impairment, coupled with his actual 
physical control of the vehicle, was so strong as to make any 
consideration of a driving pattern wholly unnecessary. 
II. Defendant's Waiver of Jury Trial Was Proper and Uncoerced. 
Defendant asserts that he was "forced" to waive a jury trial 
because the court knew that "defendant's appointment with counsel 
was less than ten days before the date the [c]ourt set for trial." 
(Appellant's Brief 6) . On the contrary, the trial setting gave the 
defendant more than adequate time to meet with counsel and timely 
demand a jury trial, or, if necessary, obtain new counsel. 
Moreover, the court warned defendant to contact his attorney 
sufficiently in advance of the trial. (Arraignment T. 6) Given 
current caseloads and speedy trial considerations, it would be 
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folly to expect trial courts to calendar cases around the 
appointment schedules of defendants and counsel. 
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel "was told by the 
prosecutor that the only way he could get a continuance was to 
waive the jury demand." (Appellant's Brief 6) This assertion is 
simply unsupported in the record. When Mr. Slaugh made his motion 
to continue, the prosecutor made the following statement: 
Your Honor, I—I've told Mr. Slaugh that I 
didn't have an objection to the continuance 
with two caveats; one being that he pay the 
witness fee for Officer Shelton who will be 
here momentarily, and the other, my 
understanding is that the jury demand was not 
timely and that it would still be a bench 
trial, if it were continued. 
(Motion T. 3) The court never indicated that the continuance would 
be denied if defendant did not waive the right to a jury trial. 
(Motion T. 2-5) In fact, Mr. Slaugh never opposed the notion of 
trying the case to the bench. Rather, he said "[a]nd I don't have 
any objection to that, your Honor, a bench trial in this is—would 
be fine." (Motion T. 3) Certainly, this court should not reverse 
defendant's conviction for lack of a jury trial when defendant's 
attorney expressly waived the jury rather than entreat the court to 
grant both a continuance and a jury trial. Nothing prohibited 
counsel from requesting the trial court to grant a jury trial in 
addition to a continuance. The waiver, in effect, took that issue 
out of the trial court's hands. While one may infer from the 
record that the prosecutor would have opposed the continuance if 
counsel had not waived the jury demand, (Motion T. 3), such 
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opposition is obviously no* tantamount to the court's ruling on the 
issue. 
Objections which have never been raised in the trial court may 
not be considered on appeal. Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 7 87 (Utah 
1986); State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985). And, an 
express waiver of rights by trial counsel is not reversible error 
in the absence of a showing that counsel's representation of the 
defendant was incompetent. Defendant has not alleged incompetence 
of counsel in this appeal. In fact, nothxng in the record suggests 
that counsel's decision was other than a tactical one. While some 
constitutional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal, 
State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676 (Utah 1982), the Constitution does 
not guarantee a jury trial for offenses punishable by a maximum of 
six months imprisonment. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 
US , 103 L.Ed 2d 550, 109 S Ct (1989); Baldwin v. New York, 
399 US 66, 26 L.Ed 2d 437, 90 S Ct 1886 (1970) . 
In misdemeanor cases, unlike felony cases, there is no 
requirement that the defendant waive the right to a jury trial in 
open court. In fact, no right to a jury trial exists in 
misdemeanor cases absent a written demand at least ten days before 
trial. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17(c)&(d). On March 8, 
1990, defendant was given notice of trial to be held on March 29, 
1990. (R. 9). Defendant's jury demand was not filed until March 
27, 1990, only two days before the trial. (R. 10) . Defendant thus 
had forfeited his right to a jury trial on the March 29 date. 
Further, the right to trial by jury may be waived not only in 
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misdemeanor cases, as is this case, but even in felony cases, 
where no jury demand is required. State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134 
(Utah App. 1989) . This right may be waived by counsel in the 
absence of the defendant. Id. at 138. In Jamison, the defendant 
was convicted by a jury of felony theft. The court recessed for 
lunch before beginning the enhancement phase of the trial. When 
the court reconvened, the defendant failed to appear. His attorney 
waived the jury on the penalty phase even though he had not 
received the defendant's authorization to do so. Id. at 136. On 
appeal, the defendant claimed that the court erred in dismissing 
the jury from the enhancement phase. This Court, however, affirmed 
the conviction and sentence. 
[W]hile the right to a jury trial is 
guaranteed by amendment VI of the United 
States Constitution and by article I. section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, it may be waived. 
Under the circumstances, it would be a 
miscarriage of justice to allow defendant to 
profit from his unexcused absence from the 
court. 
Id. at 138. (citations omitted) 
In this case, as in Jamison, defendant was absent from court 
without excuse. Defendant, by his absence, placed his attorney in 
the position of deciding whether to waive the jury without 
defendant's input. Mr. Slaugh then decided to waive the jury. As 
in Jamison, defendant should not now be allowed to profit from his 
unexcused absence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the State of Utah respectfully requests that the 
defendant's conviction for DUI be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1991. 
John K. West, Deputy Tooele County 
Attorney 
I certify that four cop.es of the forgoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand delivered this day of January, 1991 to the office 
of Mr. Alan K. Jeppesen, Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant. 
John K. West 
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